Customer Directed Advertising and Product Quality by Esteban, L. et al.
	





  
	
	
		
	

		
	
	 		!"# "$"	"# "%&		'
(
		)		 	*		" "$"+*" " %&	+
,	 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for economic research of  the 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam and  
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.  
 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Keizersgracht 482 
1017 EG Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31.(0)20.5513500 
Fax: +31.(0)20.5513555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31.(0)10.4088900 
Fax: +31.(0)10.4089031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at  
http://www.tinbergen.nl  
 
Customer Directed Advertising
and Product Quality
Lola Esteban, Jose M. Hernandez and Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez

October 2001
Abstract
We consider a market where a single seller must employ informative advertising to launch a
new product of observable quality. The monopolist may use mass, targeted or customer directed
advertising. We show that the choice of advertising strategy depends on the economic properties
of the advertising technology. If this exhibits strong economies of targeting, customer directed
advertising arises in equilibrium. Mass and targeted advertising arise under conditions that
seem empirically quite restrictive. We also show that dierent advertising strategies have a
bearing on the market outcome. While under mass and targeted advertising the price-quality
choice of the monopolist equals that under full information, under customer directed advertising
the seller brings fewer units to the market, and distorts the quality of the product and the price
in a direction that depends on the nature of product quality.
Keywords: customer directed advertising, mass advertising, monopoly, quality, targeted
advertising
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1 Introduction
With the advent of the information era, advertising technologies have changed a great deal. While in
the recent past rms launching new products could only reach their potential consumers by inserting
advertisements in the mass media, nowadays sellers have at their disposal a vast amount of distinct
advertising means, such as an array of cable and satellite radio stations and televisions, specialized
magazines and newspapers, classied Internet homepages, etc. For instance, just in US, currently
there are about 9,000 radio stations, 1,000 TV channels, 11,000 magazines, and 17,000 newspapers
(Kotler and Armstrong, 1998). These dierent advertising media are characterized by distinct
audiences, advertising rates and advertising eÆciency. As a result, sellers of new products spend a
great deal of eort to carefully select those advertising means that enable them to accurately target
high valuation consumers, thus extracting the greatest value from any dollar spent on product
development and advertising. This leads to the question of how various advertising strategies
inuence the pricing and the design of new products.
We study this inuence in a market where a single seller oers a product of observable quality.
Consumers are, in principle, unaware of the existence and the characteristics of the product and
the monopolist uses informative advertising to promote sales.
1
The advertising technology at the
disposal of the seller allows for the distribution of advertisements to a specic target audience. In
particular, the use of specialized advertising means enables the rm to focus its advertising eort
on the most eager consumers. The paper addresses three central questions. The rst issue pertains
to the optimal selection of advertising strategy. Here, we distinguish three dierent advertising
strategies and give theoretical conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In addition, we
discuss the empirical relevance of such conditions. The second issue has to do with the relationship
between the advertising strategy and the equilibrium price-quality choice of the seller. Here, we
nd that dierent advertising strategies have a bearing on the market outcome. Finally, we ask
what are the implications of the dierent advertising strategies on market performance from a social
welfare point of view. Here, we nd that these implications are sensitive to the nature of product
quality. We elaborate on these results in what follows.
Our rst concern is the equilibrium selection of advertising strategy. In this connection, we
note that our advertising technology allows for three dierent advertising strategies: (i) mass
advertising, (ii) targeted advertising, and (iii) customer directed advertising. We say that mass
advertising arises in equilibrium when the seller chooses to place ads in the general media, i.e.,
when advertisements are not targeted to any particular segment of consumers. We refer to targeted
1
The model is consistent with the launching of a new product; in such a case, a new market is created and thus
it seems reasonable to assume that a rm holds substantial market power.
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advertising as the case in which the monopolist segments the market by distributing ads to some
segment of the population who values the good more, leaving the rest of the potential consumers
who value the good less ignorant. We pay special attention to a situation in which the seller
targets ads only to some set of consumers who are willing to buy the advertised price and quality
combination. We call this type of advertising strategy customer directed advertising to capture the
fact that the seller distributes no advertisements to those consumers who are rationed by the price-
quality mechanism. In addition to the nature of the target audience of these dierent advertising
strategies, they involve the placing of ads in distinct advertising means, which, in turn, entails
distinct costs and advertising eectiveness.
We nd that the relative attractiveness of these advertising strategies hinges upon the interplay
between advertising cost and advertising eÆciency. This relationship is nicely captured by two
properties of an advertising technology. We say that an advertising technology exhibits economies
(diseconomies) of targeting if, for a given number of ad inserts, the advertising cost per con-
sumer reached diminishes (raises) as one moves from less to more specialized advertising means.
A stronger property of an advertising technology which has a substantial bite in our model is that
of strong economies (diseconomies) of targeting. These arise when the advertising cost decreases
(increases), while consumer audience increases (decreases) as we move advertisements from less to
more specialized means. We show that when the advertising technology presents strong economies
of targeting, customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium. By contrast, the existence of
strong diseconomies of targeting does not suÆce to observe mass advertising in equilibrium. From
a theoretical point of view, this suggests that mass advertising as an informative strategy can be
regarded as a rather exceptional phenomenon. After all, whether advertising technologies exhibit
(some degree of) economies or diseconomies of targeting is a matter of empirical verication. In this
connection, we provide some evidence based on Dutch and Spanish Press and Publicity Handbooks
to support the view that current real-world advertising technologies do not present strong disec-
onomies of targeting and, further, that the conditions under which customer directed advertising
arises in equilibrium seem to hold.
Our second set of results pertains to the relationship between dierent advertising strategies and
the market outcome. We nd that the price-quality choice of the monopolist under mass advertising
as well as under targeted advertising equals the price-quality choice under full information. Thus,
apart from the dierent advertising intensities that arise in equilibrium, these distinct advertising
strategies have no inuence on the market outcome. By contrast, under a customer directed
advertising strategy, the seller brings fewer units to the market, and distorts the quality and the
price in a manner that hinges upon the nature of product quality.
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We distinguish amongst two settings regarding the nature of product quality. The rst refers to
a situation in which the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is higher for those consumers
who have higher valuations for the good. In such a case we say that quality is an `intrinsic' attribute
to the product. Technical superiority features are examples in which quality has this nature, like
operation speed of microprocessors in the market for computers. We show that when quality is an
intrinsic attribute to the product, then a customer directed advertising strategy is accompanied
by quality upgrading. As a result, customer directed advertising results in lower quantity, higher
quality and higher price when quality is an intrinsic attribute to the product. The second setting
we consider is one in which the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is lower for those
consumers with higher valuations for the good. We say in this case that quality is an `extrinsic'
attribute to the product. Also in the market for computers, provision of side services like operating
system tutorials, or home installation is an example in which quality has this nature. We show
that when quality is `extrinsic' the monopolist downgrades the quality of the product and the price
implication is ambiguous.
We nally focus our attention on some welfare aspects related to the use of dierent advertising
strategies. We rst show that the private and the social incentives to use a customer directed
advertising strategy are somewhat aligned. Indeed, if the advertising technology presents strong
economies of targeting, a social planner employs customer directed advertising to promote sales,
which is consistent with the seller's choice. However, the private and the social incentives for
quantity and quality provision are generally misaligned. In this connection, we note that, compared
to a full information setting, the social planner always reduces both quantity and quality when he
promotes sales through customer directed advertising. This is inconsistent with the seller's decision
since he upgrades quality in some cases. This misalignment of incentives leads us to ask what are
the implications that the availability of advertising technologies presenting strong economies of
targeting has on social welfare. The answer to this question requires to trade o the gains and
costs brought about by the use of a customer directed advertising strategy. On the one hand,
customer directed advertising entails a higher advertising cost eÆciency than mass advertising; on
the other hand, the former may lead to a greater dead-weight loss than the latter. Our results
suggest, rst, that overall welfare gains typically arise from the private use of customer directed
advertising rather than mass advertising; second, that these gains are mostly captured by the seller;
nally, that if there is a case for which customer directed advertising reduces welfare, this case is
weakened when quality is an `intrinsic' attribute to the product.
Our model is related to the economics literature on informative advertising.
2
This literature has
2
There is another branch of the economics literature dealing with persuasive advertising (see e.g. Bloch and
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distinguished between advertising that is directly informative, i.e., that conveys `hard' information
(see e.g. Bester, 1995; Bester and Petrakis, 1995; Butters, 1977; Caminal, 1996; Grossman and
Shapiro, 1984; Moraga-Gonzalez, 2000; Robert and Stahl, 1993; Shapiro, 1980; Stahl, 1994; and
Stegeman, 1991), and advertising that is indirectly informative, i.e., that functions either as a
signal of private information (see e.g. Bagwell, 1988; Bagwell and Ramey, 1990; Kihlstrom and
Riordan, 1984; and Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) or else as a market coordination mechanism (see
Bagwell and Ramey, 1994a, 1994b). Our paper deals with informative advertising that is directly
informative and thus relates to the rst strand of this literature. Those papers, however, dier
from ours in that they do not consider the existence of specialized advertising means that allow
sellers to target advertisements to particular segments of the potential market. In this connection,
it is interesting to see the profound implications that targeting possibilities may have on product
quality and price in a monopoly setting. There is also a related number of papers which have
studied strategic coupon targeting in various segmented markets (see e.g. Bester and Petrakis,
1996; and Moraga-Gonzalez and Petrakis, 1999). In a way, these articles assume the existence
of an array of advertising means that enable sellers to target discount coupons to the most price
sensitive consumers. More closely related to our work are Hernandez (1997), and Esteban, Gil
and Hernandez (2001), who also assume that a seller can target ads to high valuation consumers.
These papers have compared the equilibrium price of a monopolist under mass advertising and
under targeted advertising for a particular advertising technology in the spirit of that of Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). The present paper, by contrast, studies the ow of inuence between product
quality and advertising strategy under fairly general advertising technologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The dis-
tinct equilibria of our model are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the welfare
implications of customer directed advertising. Section 5 closes the paper with a review of the main
conclusions.
2 The model
Consider a single producer trying to sell a new good of quality s at price p in an imperfect informa-
tion setting. Let Q(p; s) be the demand function under perfect information and P (q; s) the inverse
demand function. As usual, assume that demand is twice dierentiable, downward slopping, i.e.,
P
0
q
(q; s) < 0; and that quality is desirable, i.e., P (q; 0) = 0 and P
0
s
(q; s) > 0: Let c(s) denote the
marginal cost of producing one unit of a good of quality s: We assume that production of higher
Manceau, 1999; Dixit and Norman, 1978; and Kaldor, 1950).
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qualities is more costly, i.e., c(0) = 0 and c
0
(s) > 0:
3
Consumers a priori ignore the existence, the quality and the price of the good. This implies
that a potential consumer cannot be an actual buyer unless the seller invests in advertising and
such a consumer is reached by the advertising campaign (Stahl, 1994). To specify the details of
the advertising technology, it is useful to think of the demand function Q(p; s) as stemming from
a unitary mass of potential consumers represented by the unit interval [0; 1]; these customers buy
at most a single unit of the good. Each consumer in the unit interval has a willingness to pay x(s)
for a product whose quality is s; with x
0
(s) > 0: Assume that, for a given quality s; consumers can
be ordered according to the valuations they place on the good and that such valuations decrease
as x increases. Under this convention, we note that the monopolist would ideally like to target
advertisements to the consumers located somewhere towards the left part of the unit interval,
because these are the customers who are willing to pay more for the good (Bagwell, 2001, p. 4).
A general advertising technology:
The distinctive feature of our advertising technology is that it allows the seller to choose the
target of the advertising campaign. In particular, we assume that for any t in the unit interval
[0; 1], there is at least one advertising means that disperses ads to the consumers in [0; t]: We will
refer to t as the target of the advertising campaign. Given a price-quality pair (p; s) such that
1 > Q(p; s) > 0; we shall distinguish among three dierent advertising strategies. (i) A target t = 1
picks up the case of mass advertising, i.e., advertising that is directed to the entire population of
potential consumers, rather than being directed to a particular consumer segment. (ii) A target t
such that 1 > t > Q(p; s) refers to the case of targeted advertising, where the rm uses specialized
media to send messages towards consumers who value its product most. (iii) The case t  Q(p; s)
turns out to be of primary interest since ads are only distributed to the consumers who are not
rationed by the price-quality mechanism, i.e., to those consumers who are willing to buy quality s
at price p. We refer to this case as customer directed advertising, since every ad returns a sale.
4
An advertising technology is described by a pair fA(n; t); r(n; t)g: The rst element of the
advertising technology is the cost of the advertising campaign. We denote by A(n; t) the cost of
3
We also assume that P
00
qq
< 0; P
00
ss
< 0; c
00
(s) > 0; which are necessary for the second order conditions to be
fullled.
4
We note rst that the modeling of targeting adopted here is consistent with frequently encountered structures
of specialized advertising media in which the degree of media specialization is positively correlated with consumers'
valuation of the good. Accordingly, in many real-world situations the use of targeted advertising enables the seller
to concentrate ads on the most eager consumers. Second, the specication adopted here rules out the possibility of
sending dierent messages to disjunct sets of buyers. If this was possible, the seller's opportunities to segment the
market would be unlimited, and, consequently, he would be able to practice third-degree (or even rst-degree) price
discrimination.
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placing n ads of target t: For a given target t; we assume that A
0
n
(n; t) > 0; i.e., advertising costs
increase with the number of ads acquired. The second element of the advertising technology is the
probability r(n; t) 2 [0; 1] with which each consumer becomes informed about the existence, quality
and price of the good, when the seller acquires n ads of target t: In other words, r() is the chance
that a targeted consumer sees at least one advertisement. We assume that, given a target t; this
probability increases with the number of ads n placed by the seller, i.e., r
0
n
(n; t) > 0:
So far we have not imposed any structure on how advertising costs A() and advertising eec-
tiveness r() relate to the target t: We shall distinguish among advertising technologies based on
the following properties.
Denition 1: We say that an advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g exhibits \economies of tar-
geting" whenever, for any given number of advertisements n; it holds that
d
dt

A(n; t)
tr(n; t)

> 0:
In words, an advertising technology exhibits economies of targeting when the advertising cost
per informed consumer falls as the target t decreases. If the opposite holds, we shall say that
the advertising technology presents \diseconomies of targeting". Building on Denition 1, we now
present a stronger property of an advertising technology. This property enables us to derive clear-
cut results regarding the seller's choice of advertising strategy.
Denition 2: We say that an advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g presents \strong economies
of targeting" whenever, for any given number of advertisements n; (i) A
0
t
(n; t) > 0; and (ii) r(n; t)+
tr
0
t
(n; t) < 0.
In words, an advertising technology exhibits strong economies of targeting when, for a given
n; advertising cost decreases and consumer awareness increases, as the target t decreases. If the
conditions (i) and (ii) hold with the opposite sign, we shall say that the advertising technology
presents \strong diseconomies of targeting." We observe that an advertising technology which
exhibits strong economies of targeting also presents economies of targeting. This can be seen
by noting that fA(n; t); r(n; t)g exhibits economies of targeting if and only if A
0
t
(n; t)tr(n; t)  
A(n; t)[r(n; t) + tr
0
t
(n; t)] > 0; which holds when the conditions (i) and (ii) in Denition 2 are
satised. Observe, however, that the reverse implication does not hold.
We conclude this Section by relating our advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g to a number
of specic advertising technologies that have appeared in the economics literature on advertising.
This literature has typically modelled advertising via a cost of message production. Imposing a
particular structure on A(n; t) and r(n; t); our general advertising technology can encompass these
7
advertising cost functions. As a result, each of these examples can be seen as a particular case of
fA(); r()g: We note that most of the literature has analyzed the case of mass advertising, i.e.,
t = 1: Recent research by Hernandez (1997) and Esteban et al. (2001) allows for advertising that
can be targeted to the buyers with higher valuations.
Examples:
(i) Grossman and Shapiro (1984, p. 65) present an advertising cost function that generalizes
the specication in Butters (1977). In their paper a seller has no ability to target advertisements
to particular segments of the potential market. Therefore t = 1: The per rm expenditure needed
to reach a proportion  of the consumers is A(), with A
0

> 0. To establish a connection between
this advertising technology and fA(n; t); r(n; t)g; we note that in our model r() is monotone in
n: As a result we can obtain the number of advertisements to be placed in the mass media so
that a consumer sees an ad with probability r; i.e., n = r
 1
(r; 1): Substituting n in A() yields
A(r
 1
(r; 1); 1) = A(r): Setting r = ; the equivalence follows. An advertising cost function a la
Grossman and Shapiro has also been used in, for example, Caminal (1996), Moraga-Gonzalez and
Petrakis (1999), Robert and Stahl (1993) and Stahl (1995).
(ii) A number of these papers have used specic functional forms to derive explicit solutions.
A commonly used family of advertising cost functions is the polynomial: A() = k

, with  > 1.
We note that under this specication the advertising cost function presents constant-elasticity. Our
advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g accommodates this family of advertising cost functions by
imposing the following structure on A() and r(). Consider that the cost per ad of target t is
a(t); and that the cost of sending n ads of target t is linear, i.e., A(n; t) = na(t): Then, setting
r(n; t) = n

f(t) we obtain
A(r
 1
(r; t); t) = a(t)

r
f(t)

1

.
Setting a(1) = k;  = 1= and r=f(1) = ; the equivalence follows:
(iii) Specialized magazines with nested readerships (Esteban et al., 2001). This distribution
of media
5
assumes that for any t 2 [0; 1] there is a large number of specialized magazines with
readerships on the support [0; t], in such a way that a seller can target high-valuation consumers
5
Specialized magazines have often nested readerships. For instance, there are magazines containing general infor-
mation on sports, medicine, computers, family matters, etc., as compared to those specialized in particular sports
(soccer, basketball, golf, etc.), medical specialities (surgery, radiology, dermatology, etc.), computer issues (video-
games, Internet, etc.) or leisure activities (tness, decoration, gardening, etc.). We provide details of these structures
for the case of medicine and computer magazines in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix.
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by carefully selecting a set of these magazines. In this context, the per rm expenditure needed to
target a proportion  of the consumers whose valuations lie in the set [0; t] is A(; t) = n(; t) a(t),
with
n(; t) =
log(1  )
log

1 
z(t)
t

;
where z(t) is the readership of a magazine with target t. Our advertising technology accommodates
a distribution of magazines with nested readerships assuming that A(n; t) = na(t) and r(n; t) =
1 

1 
z(t)
t

n
: Setting  = r, the equivalence follows.
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3 Analysis
The monopolist's problem consists of choosing a tuple fp; s; t; ng so as to maximize prots. Our
primary concerns in this Section are two: rst, we ask whether and under which conditions the
dierent advertising strategies (mass, targeted and customer directed advertising) arise in equilib-
rium. Second, we analyze whether dierent advertising strategies have a bearing on the optimal
price-quality choice of the rm and its market power. A welfare analysis is pursued in Section 4.
For future reference, let us denote (p
m
; s
m
) as the equilibrium price-quality pair under full-
information, i.e., (p
m
; s
m
) = argmaxf(p; s) = (p   c(s))Q(p; s)g: Moreover, let q
m
= Q(p
m
; s
m
)
and 
m
= (p
m
; s
m
).
The optimal target of the advertising campaign, i.e., the nature of the advertising strategy, will
depend on the properties of the advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g: Our rst result states the
conditions under which mass advertising is to be observed in equilibrium. We also note that when
mass advertising arises in equilibrium, the price-quality choice of the monopolist is equal to that
under full information.
Proposition 1 [Mass advertising]
If A
0
t
(n; t) < 0 and r
0
t
(n; t) > 0; the monopolist employs mass advertising to promote sales. More-
over, the seller's price-quality choice under mass advertising is equal to (p
m
; s
m
):
6
In fact, our advertising technology can be interpreted more broadly. For example, we can consider a nested
distribution of magazines with only one magazine available for each target t. In this alternative framework, n should
be interpreted as the advertising eort exerted in a single magazine {e.g. the number of ads inserted in the magazine,
the size and color of the ad, etc.{. Finally, our model accommodates other types of specialized advertising media
such as cable television or radio. These media might not be nested, in such a way that the ads could be distributed
in any interval in the set [0; t].
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Proof. For any p; s, the prots of the monopolist are given by
() = (p  c(s))minfQ(p; s); tgr(n; t)  A(n; t) (1)
Assume, for the moment, that minfQ(p; s); tg = Q(p; s): We note that the price-quality pair that
maximizes (p  c(s))Q(p; s) also maximizes (p  c(s))Q(p; s)r(n; t) A(n; t): Therefore, p = p
m
and
s = s
m
: Dierentiating (1) with respect to t yields

0
t
() = 
m
r
0
t
(n; t) A
0
t
(n; t): (2)
Mass advertising arises in equilibrium if and only if the sign of (2) is positive, which holds when
the conditions above are met. But t = 1 is indeed greater than Q(p
m
; s
m
); which completes the
proof.
We now elaborate on some aspects of this result. We note rst that the price-quality choice of
the monopolist under mass advertising maximizes the full information prot. The reason is that
under this advertising strategy, there does not exist a direct connection between the size of the
potential demand and the advertising eort. Indeed, a marginal change in advertising intensity
does not aect the dierence between marginal revenue and marginal cost. As a result, neither the
equilibrium price nor the quality level depends on the advertising eort.
Second, we note that the conditions suÆcing for mass advertising to arise in equilibrium are
intimately related to the nature of the advertising technology. In particular, the conditionA
0
t
(n; t) <
0 holds if there are strong diseconomies of targeting. By contrast, the condition r
0
t
(n; t) > 0 is
stronger than {and by implication not necessarily implied by{ strong diseconomies of targeting.
Inspection of equation (2) reveals that the presence of diseconomies of targeting, or even the
existence of strong diseconomies of targeting, does not suÆce for mass advertising to arise in
equilibrium. We view this theoretical result as suggesting that the use of mass advertising to
promote sales may be a rather exceptional phenomenon.
This theoretical observation is reinforced by existing empirical evidence suggesting that ad-
vertising technologies do not typically present strong diseconomies of targeting. For the case of
cable television, Heighton and Cunningham (1984, p. 87) claim that the cost of an advertisement
is usually inversely related, while the cost per consumer reached is directly related, to the de-
gree of specialization of the channel employed. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that
A
0
t
(n; t) > 0; and, by implication, that advertising in cable television does not exhibit strong disec-
onomies of targeting.
We now report further evidence gathered by us supporting the same view, i.e., that A
0
t
(n; t) > 0:
This evidence corresponds to a particular advertising technology for which we have found the
10
necessary data, namely, that of specialized magazines with nested readerships described above.
The information contained in Tables A.1 and A.2 given in the Appendix has been compiled from
the `Handbook of the Dutch Press and Publicity (2001)' (Handboek van de Nederlandse Pers en
Publiciteit, 2001).
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This Handbook provides readerships and advertising rates for a very large set
of magazines; these magazines are classied according to the eld, subject or topic they treat. The
dierent contents of various magazines can be seen as distinct degrees of specialization; we note
that this is precisely the manner in which the Handbook interprets them.
To illustrate, we next discuss in some detail the case of medicine magazines (Table A.1). These
are magazines generally read by the health care community. In line with the Handbook, in Table
A.1, we have grouped some of these magazines in distinct categories, which correspond to the
professional eld in which (most of) the articles appearing in these magazines belong. It can be seen
that there are general medicine magazines, and magazines specialized in Buccal Health, Cardiology,
Logopedia and Phonetics, Midwifery, Neurology, Oncology, and Psychiatry. The table reports the
readerships and the prices (in Euros) charged for a colored full page advertisement. We note
that moving from placing ads in general medicine magazines, like Medisch Vandaag, to advertising
in more specialized ones, for instance Tidschrift voor Verloskundigen specialized in midwifery, or
Tijdschrift voor Kanker specialized in oncology, is interpreted in our context as concentrating the
ads on a particular segment of the market (a decrease in t). Thus, if, for example, a pharmaceutical
rm has developed a new drug intended to treat cancer, this rm can place ads in general medicine
magazines, or in magazines specialized in oncology.
We have carried out the same examination for other markets, like the market for computers and
computer software, or the market for leisure activities. In the market for computers, for instance,
inspection of the Handbook reveals that there are general computer magazines and magazines
specialized in Atari computers, Macintosh computers, the Nintendo 64 console, the Wordperfect
word processor, the Internet, etc. (see Table A.2).
Using the information provided in Tables A.1 and A.2, we can analyze the sign of A
0
t
(n; t). For
this purpose, we notice that, for the advertising technology under consideration, A
0
t
(n; t) = na
0
(t)
(see above) and readily compute a
0
(t) ' a=t, where a(t) is approximated by the average cost
per ad of the set of magazines with target t. As a proxy for t to be used in the computations, we
have chosen the largest readership of those magazines with the same degree of specialization. Table
1 provides these results.
7
We also analyzed the data reported in the `Spanish Guide to the Communication Media' (1999) (Gua de los
Medios de Comunicacion de Espa~na, 1999), which yielded a similar insight.
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Magazines Av. Ad price a(t) Target t a
0
(t)
General Medicine 3,100.75 21,240
Cardiology 2,599 2,500 0.0267
Neurology 1,992.3 1,875 0.0572
Buccal Health 2,217 1,850 0.0455
Logopedia/Phonetics 1,840 4,903 0.0770
Midwifery 440 2,600 0.1427
Oncology 2,301.5 3,355 0.0446
Psychiatry 2,225.75 3,800 0.0501
General Computers 8,103.75 187,499
Macintosh 3,600 21,000 0.0270
Atari 2,500 20,000 0.0334
Games 6,370.4 74,772 0.0153
Microsoft 5,445 40,000 0.0180
WordPerfect/Corel 4,300 25,000 0.0234
Windows 5,350 40,000 0.0186
Nintendo64 4,250 18,000 0.0227
Table 1. Empirical Evidence on Dutch Magazines: A
0
t
(n; t)
The empirical evidence reported in Table 1 suggests that moving an advertising campaign from
less to more specialized magazines yields a cost saving, i.e., A
0
t
(n; t) > 0. On the basis of this
observation, we conclude that real-world advertising technologies do not typically present strong
diseconomies of targeting.
In what follows, we will investigate the conditions under which advertising strategies other than
mass advertising arise in equilibrium. Moreover, we shall provide an account of the implications that
these dierent advertising strategies have on the price-quality choice and the advertising intensity of
the seller. Building upon the above observations, we shall assume that A
0
t
(n; t) > 0 and distinguish
between targeted advertising and customer directed advertising.
Proposition 2 [Targeted advertising]
(i) Targeted advertising arises in equilibrium only if there exists t 2 (q
m
; 1) such that 
m
r
0
t
(n; t) 
A
0
t
(n; t) = 0: The equilibrium price-quality choice under targeted advertising equals (p
m
; s
m
): (ii)
Moreover, under a constant-elasticity advertising technology, targeted advertising is more intense
than mass advertising.
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Proof. (i) The prots of the monopolist are given by
() = (p  c(s))minfQ(p; s); tgr(n; t)  A(n; t):
From Proposition 1, it follows that, for any t > Q(p; s); the price-quality pair that maximizes
seller's prots is (p
m
; s
m
): Dierentiation with respect to t yields
(p
m
  c(s
m
))q
m
r
0
t
(n; t) A
0
t
(n; t) = 0: (3)
The monopolist uses targeted advertising to promote sales only if equation (3) has an interior
solution; the result follows.
(ii) Let
b
t be the solution to equation (3). Dierentiating prots with respect to n yields
(p
m
  c(s
m
))q
m
r
0
n
(n; t) A
0
n
(n; t) = 0: (4)
We now show that dn=dt < 0 for all t 2
 
b
t; 1

. To obtain dn=dt, we dierentiate equation (4)
totally:

m
[r
00
nt
(n; t)dt+ r
00
nn
(n; t)dn] A
00
nt
(n; t)dt A
00
nn
(n; t)dn = 0.
Isolating dn=dt yields
dn
dt
=  

m
r
00
nt
(n; t) A
00
nt
(n; t)

m
r
00
nn
(n; t) A
00
nn
(n; t)
: (5)
The denominator of this expression is negative (second order conditions). Thus, the sign of dn=dt
is equal to the sign of 
m
r
00
nt
(n; t)   A
00
nt
(n; t): For a constant-elasticity advertising technology, we
have that r
0
t
(n; t) = n

f
0
(t), A
0
t
(n; t) = a
0
(t)n, r
00
nt
(n; t) = n
 1
f
0
(t), A
00
nt
(n; t) = a
0
(t). Therefore,
r
00
nt
(n; t) = r
0
t
(n; t)=n, and A
00
nt
(n; t) = A
0
t
(n; t)=n. Thus, the sign of (5) equals the sign of
1
n


m
r
0
t
(n; t) A
0
t
(n; t)

<
1
n


m
r
0
t
(n; t) A
0
t
(n; t)

< 0;
where the last inequality follows from the fact that t 2 (
b
t; 1); the result follows.
Seen together, Propositions 1 and 2 show that a targeted advertising strategy leads to the same
price-quality choice as a mass advertising strategy, and, further, that this choice equals that under
full information. However, this result does not imply that mass and targeted advertising necessarily
lead to exactly the same market outcome. The dierence between these advertising strategies is
the intensity with which the seller promotes sales. Proposition 2,(ii) suggests that, typically, the
higher eectiveness embodied in a targeted advertising strategy compared to a mass advertising
strategy will lead the rm to acquire a number of ads greater under the former strategy than under
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the latter. Taking into account that from a social perspective a monopolist always undersupplies
informative advertising (Shapiro, 1980), it follows that the use of targeted advertising is in fact
welfare improving.
We now turn to analyze the case in which the seller promotes sales by using a customer directed
advertising strategy. Our rst observation is that a monopolist will never choose a target t and a
price-quality pair (p; s), such that Q(p; s) > t:
Lemma 1 Under customer directed advertising t = Q(p; s):
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that Q(p; s) > t > 0: Then, the prots of the monop-
olist are given by
() = (p  c(s))tr(n; t) A(n; t);
which decrease monotonically with s: Therefore, in equilibrium, any t < Q(p; s) should be accom-
panied by s = 0. However, Q(p; 0) = 0 < t for any t; which constitutes a contradiction.
Our second result shows that if there are strong economies of targeting, then customer directed
advertising arises in equilibrium. Moreover, we note that a customer directed advertising strategy
has an important bearing on the market outcome. Let (q
d
; p
d
; s
d
) denote the equilibrium quantity,
price and quality of the seller under customer directed advertising. Then:
Proposition 3 [Customer directed advertising]
(i) If there are strong economies of targeting, customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium.
(ii) Under customer directed advertising the optimal price-quality choice of the monopolist is such
that:
(a) q
d
< q
m
;
(b) s
d
< s
m
if and only if P
00
sq
> 0:
(c) If P
00
sq
< 0; then p
d
> p
m
:
Proof. (i) If conditions (i) and (ii) in Denition 2 above hold, then (p  c(s))Q(p; s)r
0
t
(n; t) 
A
0
t
(n; t) < 0. But this implies that the rst derivative of the seller's prot function with respect to
t is always negative. Consequently, t = Q(p; s):
(ii) It is useful to employ the inverse demand function to write the problem of the monopolist
under customer directed advertising as follows:
Max
fq;s;ng
[P (q; s)  c(s)]qr(n; q) A(n; q) (6)
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The rst order conditions of this problem are:
[P (q; s) + P
0
q
(q; s)q   c(s)]r(n; q) + [P (q; s)  c(s)]qr
0
q
(n; q) A
0
q
(n; q) = 0 (7)
P
0
s
(q; s)  c
0
(s) = 0 (8)
[P (q; s)  c(s)]qr
0
n
(n; q) A
0
n
(n; q) = 0 (9)
Note rst that the optimal quality choice does not depend directly on the number of ads acquired
n: Let us denote the solution of (8) as s = s
d
(q): The fact that customer directed advertising
occurs in equilibrium implies that [P (q; s)   c(s)]qr
0
q
(n; q)   A
0
q
(n; q) < 0: Therefore, a solution
to equations (7) and (8) must satisfy P (q; s
d
(q)) + P
0
q
(q; s
d
(q))q   c(s
d
(q)) > 0: Note that, for
a given quantity q; the quality choice under perfect information s
m
(q)  s
d
(q): Then, it must
hold that P (q; s
d
(q)) + P
0
q
(q; s
d
(q))q   c(s
d
(q)) = P (q; s
m
(q)) + P
0
q
(q; s
m
(q))q   c(s
m
(q)) > 0: Since
P (q
m
; s
m
(q
m
)) + P
0
q
(q
m
; s
m
(q
m
))q
m
  c(s
m
(q
m
)) = 0 and P (q; s(q)) + P
0
q
(q; s(q))q   c(s(q)) is a
decreasing function of q (second order conditions), it follows that q
d
< q
m
: This proves (a)
(b) From (8) it follows that s
d
= s(q
d
) satises P
0
s
(q
d
; s
d
) = c
0
(s
d
): Similarly s
m
= s(q
m
) is the
solution to P
0
s
(q
m
; s
m
) = c
0
(s
m
): Since q
d
< q
m
; P
0
s
(q
d
; s
m
)   c
0
(s
m
) > 0 if and only if P
00
sq
< 0:
Maximization requires that the second order conditions are satised, i.e., P
00
ss
()   c
00
() < 0: This
implies that P
0
s
(q
d
; s)   c
0
(s) declines with s and, therefore, that there exists s
d
> s
m
such that
P
0
s
(q
d
; s
d
)  c
0
(s
d
) = 0: The other case is proved similarly.
(c) Notice that dP (q; s(q))=dq = P
0
q
+ P
0
s
s
0
q
: Since P
00
sq
< 0 implies s
0
q
< 0; the result follows.
We now elaborate on two aspects of this result. The rst pertains to the nature of the conditions
under which customer directed advertising arises. The second relates to the profound implications
that a customer directed advertising strategy has for quantity and quality provision.
Proposition 3 shows that the existence of strong economies of targeting suÆces to observe
customer directed advertising. We note however that the seller will use this advertising strategy to
promote sales under conditions that are weaker than those in Denition 2; in particular, r
0
t
(n; t) < 0
suÆces for customer directed advertising to arise in equilibrium (see the proof of this result). Below,
we shall present empirical evidence pertaining to the advertising technology of specialized magazines
discussed above to suggest that this condition holds.
Second, Proposition 3 shows that if the seller is able to target advertisements to those consumers
who are not rationed by the price-quality mechanism, this has an important bearing on the market
outcome. In particular, we can see that, under customer directed advertising, the seller brings
fewer units to the market, may oer lower quality and may charge higher prices, as compared to a
full information setting. We now elaborate on the economic intuition behind these results.
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We note rst that under customer directed advertising, any variation in the seller's price-
quality choice modies the size of the targeted segment t = Q(p; s); which in turn has a bearing on
advertising costs. This is the fundamental feature of customer directed advertising: it establishes a
direct linkage between the size of the potential demand and the cost of the advertising campaign.
This in turn gives the rm incentives to deviate from the equilibrium price-quality choice under
full information.
Second, a monopolist who employs customer directed advertising puts fewer units in the market;
this implies that the typical quantity distortion introduced by a monopolist is greater under cus-
tomer directed advertising than under full information. For a given level of quality, this translates
immediately into a higher price.
Third, we note that the level of quality supplied by the rm is also distorted. Interestingly, the
direction of this distortion is sensitive to the nature of product quality. We distinguish quality as
an `intrinsic' attribute to the product from quality as an `extrinsic' attribute to the product. We
say that quality is `intrinsic' (`extrinsic') when the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality if
higher for those consumers who have higher (lower) valuations for the good, i.e., when P
00
sq
< (>)0.
Examples in which quality has an `intrinsic' nature are those in which extra quality means superior
technical features, like the speed of operation of a microprocessor, or the capacity of a hard disk, in
the market for computers. In such a case, quality is distorted upwards. By contrast, when quality
is an `extrinsic' attribute of the product, like, also in the market for computers, the case of side
services such as getting-started tutorials, home installation, then quality is distorted downwards.
The economic intuition behind this observation stems from the rst order condition (8) above. This
equation reveals that the incentives of the seller to invest in quality provision are related to the
willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality of the marginal consumer. Since the quantity put in
the market under customer directed advertising is lower than the full information optimal quantity,
the question is whether the marginal consumer in the rst case is willing to pay more or less for
quality than the marginal consumer in the second case. When quality is intrinsic, the marginal
consumer under customer directed advertising advertising values more quality than that under full
information and, consequently, the seller invests in quality upgrading. By contrast, when quality
is extrinsic, the opposite holds and the seller downgrades quality.
Finally, to account for price distortions, we note that both the quantitative as well as the
qualitative implications of this advertising strategy must be taken into consideration. When the
willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality decreases with the quantity put in the market, then
the price charged by the monopolist is higher. By contrast, if the willingness to pay for quality
increases with the quantity, then the price may increase or decrease. Hence, a customer directed
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advertising strategy may be accompanied with fewer units of lower quality oered at a higher price!
Obviously, the interest of these results depends on the practical relevance of customer directed
advertising. To shed light on this point, it is convenient to nd empirical evidence about the
relationship between the probability with which a consumer sees an advertisement and the target
of the advertising campaign. Unfortunately, r(n; t) is not directly observable, and therefore it is
diÆcult to provide evidence about the sign of r
0
t
(n; t). A possible way out is, again, to restrict
ourselves to the class of advertising technologies with nested specialized magazines. For this class
of advertising technologies, as derived above, we have that the sign of r
0
t
(n; t) is equal to the sign
of (z
0
t
(t)t  z(t)) where z(t) is the readership of magazines of target t: Basing on the information
we have compiled from the `Handbook of the Dutch Press and Publicity (2001)' (Tables A.1 and
A.2 in the Appendix), we can approximate the value of z(t) by the average readership of the class
of magazines corresponding to the target t. Again, as a proxy for t to be used in the computation
of r
0
t
(n; t); we have chosen the largest readership of those magazines of target t. Table 2 provides
this information.
Magazines Av. Readership z(t) Target t
z
0
(t)t
z(t)
  1
General Medicine 12,673 21,240
Cardiology 2,150 2,500 -0.347
Neurology 1,542 1,875 -0.301
Buccal Health 1,850 1,850 -0.442
Logopedia/Phonetics 4,903 4,903 -0.524
Midwifery 2,600 2,600 -0.459
Oncology 2,177 3,355 -0.096
Psychiatry 2,364 3,800 -0.049
General Computers 119,976 187,499
Macintosh 21,000 21,000 -0.472
Atari 20,000 20,000 -0.403
Games 51,954 74,772 -0.132
Microsoft 40,000 40,000 -0.457
WordPerfect/Corel 25,000 25,000 -0.415
Windows 40,000 40,000 -0.457
Nintendo64 18,000 18,000 -0.398
Table 2. Empirical Evidence on Dutch Magazines: r
0
t
(n; t)
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This empirical evidence suggests that r
0
t
(n; t) is generally negative, which means that a seller should
generally choose customer directed advertising to promote sales. Seen from another point of view,
the joint evidence reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that the conditions which are necessary for
mass advertising as well as targeted advertising to arise in equilibrium do not hold (see equations
(2) and (3) above). As a result, it is expected that these advertising strategies will lose practical
relevance as advertising technologies evolve over time. Thus, imposing exogenously a mass adver-
tising strategy {as most of the literature has done so far (see the Introduction){ may no longer be
a fortunate working assumption in many contexts.
Against this background, a key issue is to determine how the availability of customer directed
advertising impacts the degree of market power of the rm. To that end, we take the Lerner index
as a measure of market power: L(q; s) = (P (q; s)  c(s))=P (q; s). We note that @L()=@p > 0, and
@L()=@s < 0: The signs of these derivatives make this examination non-trivial, since when the rm
employs a customer directed advertising strategy, both quality and price may move in the same
direction. Let us denote by L
m
(q
m
; s
m
(q
m
)) the Lerner index under full information. We note that
L
m
() derives from a simple elasticity rule:
P (q; s
m
(q))  c(s
m
(q))
P (q; s
m
(q))
=
1
E
p
(q; s
m
(q))
, (10)
where E
p
(q; s) denotes the price elasticity of demand. Let us denote by L
d
(q
d
; s
d
(q
d
)) the Lerner
index under customer directed advertising. Substituting (8) in (7), the following relationship ob-
tains:
[P (q; s
d
(q))  c(s
d
(q))]

1 +
qr
0
q
(n; q)
r(n; q)

 
P (q; s
d
(q))
E
p
(q; s
d
(q))
=
A
0
q
(n; q)
r(n; q)
Taking into consideration that s
m
(q)  s
d
(q), some algebra yields that L
d
(q
d
; s
d
(q
d
)) = L
d
(q
d
; s
m
(q
d
)),
the latter being determined by the following equation:
P (q; s
m
(q))  c(s
m
(q))
P (q; s
m
(q))
=

1
E
p
(q; s
m
(q))
+
A
0
q
(n; q)
P (q; s
m
(q)) r(n; q)

1
h
1 +
qr
0
q
(n;q)
r(n;q)
i
: (11)
The comparison between (10) and (11) reveals that the change in seller's degree of market power
when he uses customer directed advertising rather than mass advertising depends on the signs
of A
0
t
(n; t); r
0
t
(n; t); and dE
p
=dq: Since A
0
t
(n; t) > 0; and since it is reasonable to assume that
r
0
t
(n; t) < 0 under customer directed advertising {which is corroborated by the empirical evidence
given above{, for a given n; we have that, A
0
q
(n; q)= (P (q; s
m
(q))r(n; q)) > 0, and qr
0
q
(n; q)=r(n; q) <
0. Consequently, noting that q
d
< q
m
; we have the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume that A
0
t
(n; t) > 0 and r
0
t
(n; t) < 0: Then, L
d
() > L
m
() if dE
p
=dq  0:
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This Proposition gives a suÆcient condition under which the market allocation chosen by a
monopolist who uses customer directed advertising to promote sales gives greater market power to
the seller. This result, however, does not necessarily imply that a customer directed advertising
strategy is welfare reducing. The reason is that, under customer directed advertising, every ad
returns a sale and, thus, this advertising strategy is more eective than others. This remark calls
for an examination of how the transition from mass to customer directed advertising can aect
welfare. In general, from the society point of view, we must trade-o possible increases in the
deadweight-loss against gains in advertising eÆciency. We undertake this task in the next Section.
4 Welfare
We address three issues in this Section. The rst issue we examine pertains to the conditions under
which a social planner uses customer directed advertising to promote sales. The second compares
the social incentives for quantity and quality provision under mass advertising and under customer
directed advertising. Finally, we examine the question left open above about whether the private
adoption of customer directed advertising has a negative impact on the level of social welfare.
As a welfare measure, we take the conventional expression of gross consumer surplus minus
production and advertising costs:
W (q; s; n; t) =
q
Z
0
P (; s) d r(n; t)  c(s) r(n; t) A(n; t):
The next Proposition shows that the social incentives to choose a customer directed advertis-
ing strategy are somewhat aligned with the private incentives. In particular, if there are strong
economies of targeting, the social planner nds it optimal to use a customer directed advertising
strategy. This is consistent with the seller's choice. The Proposition also reveals that the social
incentives for quantity and quality provision may be misaligned with the private ones. Let (q

m
; s

m
)
and (q

d
; s

d
) be the optimal quantity and quality put in the market by a social planner who promote
sales through mass and customer directed advertising, respectively.
Proposition 5 (i) If there are strong economies of targeting, the planner promotes sales by cus-
tomer directed advertising. (ii) Moreover, under customer directed advertising, the socially optimal
quantity-quality choice is such that q

d
< q

m
, and s

d
< s

m
.
Proof. (i) The planner uses customer directed advertising if and only if
q
Z
0
[(P (; s)  c(s)] d r
0
t
(n; t) A
0
t
(n; t) < 0, (12)
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which holds, given Denition 2.
ii) Under mass advertising, the rst order conditions with respect to q and s are
[(P (q; s)  c(s)] r(n; 1) = 0 (13)
q
Z
0
P
0
s
(; s) d  c
0
(s) = 0; (14)
respectively. Under customer directed advertising, t = Q(p; s) and the rst order conditions with
respect to q and s are, in this case,
[(P (q; s)  c(s)] r(n; q) +
q
Z
0
[(P (; s)  c(s)] d r
0
q
(n; q) A
0
q
(n; q) = 0 (15)
q
Z
0
P
0
s
(; s) d  c
0
(s) = 0; (16)
respectively. If s

m
(q) and s

d
(q) are solutions to (14) and (16), respectively, then it follows that
s

m
(q)  s

d
(q). Thus, substituting (14) into (13) yields P (q

m
; s

m
(q

m
)) = c(s

m
(q

m
)) or, equivalently,
P (q

m
; s

d
(q

m
)   c(s

d
(q

m
)) = 0. Moreover, since (12) holds under customer directed advertising,
equation (15) implies P (q

d
; s

d
(q

d
))  c(s

d
(q

d
)) > 0. Since P (q; s)  c(s) is a decreasing function of q
(second order conditions), it follows that q

d
< q

m
. Finally, applying the implicit function theorem
to (14), we obtain the nature of the relationship between quality and quantity:
ds
dq
=  
P
0
s
(q; s)
q
R
0
P
00
ss
(; s)d  c
00
(s)
> 0
where the inequality follows from the conditions above. Since q

d
< q

m
; it follows that s

d
< s

m
.
This result shows that when the advertising technology presents strong economies of targeting,
the social planner restricts the quantity and downgrades the quality of the product. The rst eect
is in line with the seller's decision; by contrast, while the seller may upgrade quality in some cases,
the social planner always reduces the supply of quality (see Proposition 3). This misalignment
between the private and the social incentives to alter quality arises because while the seller only
cares about the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality of the marginal consumer (see
equation (8)), the social planner is concerned with the aggregate willingness to pay for an extra
unit of quality (see (14)). The former may increase or decrease according to whether quality is
intrinsic or extrinsic, respectively, while the latter always decreases.
These remarks lead us to question what is the nature of the impact that the private adoption
of customer directed advertising has on social welfare. Of course, this examination is in the spirit
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of a second best analysis. We have been unable to oer a general characterization of the conditions
under which the private adoption of customer directed advertising reduces welfare. To gain further
insight in this issue, we have chosen to solve our model for a particular family of demand and
cost functions. This family encompasses models often employed in the literature and captures the
`intrinsic' and `extrinsic' nature of product quality. We now present the details of this specication.
Demand function:
We assume that market demand stems from a unitary mass of consumers characterized by a
taste parameter  uniformly distributed in the unit interval. A consumer's utility is U = +f(s) 
g(s)   p, when he buys the good of quality s at price p, with f(s)  0, f(s)    g(s)  0, and
f
0
(s)   g
0
(s) > 0. No consumption gives zero utility. The economic interpretation of this utility
function is the following: (i) Since  > 0, consumers enjoy the good per se; (ii) f(s)  0 indicates
that consumers may attach value to quality per se, independently of the taste parameter; nally,
(iii) f(s)   g(s)  0 together with f
0
(s)   g
0
(s) > 0 imply that consumers always prefer higher
qualities.
8
We note that this manner of modelling vertical product dierentiation encompasses
a number of utility functions frequently found in the literature.
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Standard derivations yield a
demand function Q(p; s) = 1   (p  f(s)) = (1  g(s)). We now consider that f(s) = s   1=s
k 1
and g(s) = 1   1=s
k 1
; which satisfy the above conditions for all  2 [0; 1] when k  0 and s > 1:
It obtains that Q(p; s) = s
k
(1  p=s). We note that k < 1 refers to a situation where quality
attributes are `intrinsic', i.e., P
00
sq
< 0; by contrast, k > 1 gathers the case of `extrinsic' quality
attributes, i.e., P
00
sq
> 0. Finally, the case k = 1 will be regarded as a `neutral' case.
Advertising and production cost functions:
We consider the advertising technology fA(n; t); r(n; t)g = fna(t); n

f(t)g. As pointed out
above, this advertising technology encompasses the family of polynomial advertising cost functions
with constant elasticity. We further assume that f(t) = t
 
and  = 1=2. Furthermore, we note
that, in line with the empirical evidence provided in Table 3, a is rather insensitive to t; thus, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume a(t) = a(1) = a. Finally, we employ a marginal cost specication
quadratic in quality, c(s) = bs
2
=2.
With these market conditions at hand, one can solve the problems (1) and (6) outlined above.
These give us the equilibrium market allocations and advertising intensities under mass and cus-
8
We note that this specication allows for the valuation of quality to be positively or negatively related to the
taste parameter, i.e., we do not place any restriction on the sign of g(s).
9
In particular, setting f(s) = 0 and g(s) = 1   s yields U = s  p (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Moreover, setting
f(s) = g(s) = s leads to U =  + (1  ) s  p (Tirole, 1988, p. 104).
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tomer directed advertising, respectively. We obtain:
p
m
=
2 (1 + k)(2 + k)
b(3 + k)
2
, s
m
=
2 (1 + k)
b(3 + k)
, r
m
=
2
k
(1 + k)
1+k
ab
1+k
(3 + k)
3+k
, n
m
=
4
k
(1 + k)
2+2k
a
2
b
2+2k
(3 + k)
6+2k
p
d
=
2 (k
2
+ 6k + 8)
b(5 + k)
2
, s
d
=
2 (2 + k)
b(5 + k)
, r
d
=
2(2 + k)
ab(5 + k)
2
, n
d
=
2
2+k
(2 + k)
2+k
a
2
b
2+k
(5 + k)
5+k
On the basis of these results, we can compute the impact that moving from a mass advertising
strategy to a customer directed advertising strategy has on social welfare. Table 3 displays the
percent changes in price, quality and degree of market power (Lerner index) for various values of
the parameter k. These values have been chosen so that they generate an advertising cost-to-sales
ratio ranging from 8% to 25%. This is consistent with the stylized fact that when a rm launches
a new product, it usually incurs an advertising cost that represents an average of about 20% of
sales (Kotler and Armstrong, 1998). The table also reports the set of values 	 =

b; b

for which
the above problems have interior solutions that satisfy q < 1 and s > 1. Finally, the table contains
the subset of values of b for which consumer surplus and social welfare decrease (sets  and 
,
respectively).
k=0 k=0.5 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4
p
d
 p
m
p
m
+44% +21% +11% +2%  1:5%  3:2%
s
d
 s
m
s
m
+20% +6% 0%  4:8%  6:2%  6:7%
L
m
+50% +40% +33% +25% +20% +16%
L
d
 L
m
L
m
0% +11% +20% +33% +44% +50%
	 [0; 0:66] [0:07; 0:85] [0:25; 1] [0:53; 1:14] [0:73; 1:25] [0:87; 1:39]
 ; [0:07; 0:19] [0:25; 0:42] [0:53; 0:69] [0:73; 0:86] [0:87; 0:98]

 ; [0:07; 0:08] [0:25; 0:28] [0:53; 0:56] [0:73; 0:75] [0:87; 0:89]
Table 3. Simulation Results
Table 3 shows a number of issues. The rst is that the welfare implications of customer directed
advertising are sensitive to the quality attributes of the product. In particular, on average, the
size of the sets 
 and  relative to the set 	 is greater for k > 1 than for k < 1. This implies
that the set of parameters for which consumer surplus and welfare decrease when quality is an
extrinsic attribute to the product is larger than when quality has an intrinsic nature. The second
issue we see is that the size of 
 relative to 	 is generally quite small. This suggests that, even
though the possibility that customer directed advertising leads to a welfare decrease cannot be
excluded in this model, the likelihood of occurrence of this event is not large. Finally, additional
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computations yield that, on average, the maximum potential loss for consumers is 33%, whereas
the maximum potential social welfare loss is 7:8%. In summary, the analysis of Table 3 suggests
that the transition from mass to customer directed advertising is likely to be welfare improving,
but may well decrease consumer surplus. We now elaborate on the intuition behind these insights.
We distinguish the case of intrinsic, neutral and extrinsic quality attributes to gain in exposition
clarity.
Case 1: Intrinsic Quality ( 0  k < 1).
As compared to the use of mass advertising, a customer directed advertising strategy leads to a
reduction in the number of units of output that the rm puts in the market. This quantitative-eect
has two major implications associated. First, since quality attributes are intrinsic in the case under
consideration, a quantity cut implies that the rm targets consumers with a higher willingness to
pay for quality. This leads the seller to increase the supply of quality. This quality-eect increases
the marginal cost of quality provision c(s), which tends to reduce the rm's degree of market power.
Secondly, the quantity-eect has a bearing on the market price. This is given by
dP
dq
=
@P
@q
+
@P
@s
ds
d
dq
: (17)
Since quality is intrinsic, both terms in this equation work in the same direction and, therefore,
there is a price-eect which tends to increase the rm's degree of market power, dP=dq < 0. The
case k = 0 (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) is special, in the sense that the price-eect entirely osets
the quality-eect; this yields the remark that the use of customer directed advertising need not
aect the rm's degree of market power. Since market power remains unaltered in such a case,
the higher advertising cost eÆciency associated to a customer directed advertising strategy implies
that this advertising means is benecial for consumers and for society as a whole. By contrast, if
0 < k < 1, the price-eect dominates and thus the use of customer directed advertising generates a
trade-o between a higher advertising eÆciency and a greater monopoly power, which might lead
to a welfare loss. For example, if k = 0:5, consumer surplus decreases when b < 0:19, whereas
welfare decreases when b < 0:08 (Table 3).
Case 2: Neutral Quality ( k = 1)
In this case, there is no quality-eect and thus the price eect is unambiguously negative. As a
result, the use of customer directed advertising always increases the degree of market power, which
increases the potential for a welfare loss.
Case 3: Extrinsic Quality ( k > 1)
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In this situation the quantity eect leads the rm to target consumers with a lower valuation of
quality, which in turn drives the monopolist to reduce the supply of quality. Thus, the quality-eect
is positive; this tends to further increase the level of market power. Moreover, the fact that the
second term in the RHS of equation (17) above is positive, implies that the market price might fall,
and so the price-eect could reduce the level of market power. In our example, the quality-eect is
always stronger than the price-eect and, therefore, the use of customer directed advertising further
increases the rm's degree of market power.
5 Conclusions
We have studied an economy where a single seller launches a new product of observable quality.
Central to our analysis is the fact that consumers are, in principle, unaware of the existence and the
characteristics of the product. This implies that the seller would face no positive demand unless
he invested in an advertising campaign to promote sales of his product. We have identied three
possible advertising strategies at the disposal of the seller: mass advertising, targeted advertising
and customer directed advertising. The feature that distinguishes these advertising strategies is the
target of the advertising campaign, that is, the set of consumers to whom the seller distributes ads.
We have studied the conditions under which dierent advertising strategies arise in equilibrium. In
addition, we have explored the implications that distinct advertising strategies have on the price-
quality choice of the monopolist. Finally, we have examined the welfare implications associated to
the adoption of a customer directed advertising strategy.
We have found that the choice of advertising strategy of the seller is intimately related to the
properties of the advertising technology at his disposal. When the advertising technology exhibits
strong economies of targeting, then the monopolist promotes sales through customer directed ad-
vertising. This is a strategy under which no consumer rationed by the price-quality mechanism
receives advertisements. In such a case, we have shown that, compared to the market allocation
under full information, the seller puts fewer units in the market, and distorts the quality and the
price in a manner that is sensitive to the quality attributes to the product. By contrast, a mass
advertising strategy as well as a targeted advertising strategy have no impact on the market out-
come. We have also gathered empirical evidence supporting the view that the conditions under
which customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium seem to hold in real-world markets. The
same evidence suggests that mass advertising and targeted advertising may be rather exceptional
phenomena in current markets.
We have also compared the social and the private incentives to use CDA advertising and the
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incentives for quantity and quality provision. We have found that a social planner has incentives
to use customer directed advertising somewhat in line with those of the seller. However, the
social incentives for quantity and quality provision may dier from those of the monopolist. This
potential misalignment of incentives may lead to a welfare loss when the seller uses customer
directed advertising rather than mass advertising. We have seen that this potential welfare loss
is less likely when quality is an intrinsic attribute of the product. Finally, when there are welfare
gains, the rm typically captures a larger fraction than the consumers.
The most fascinating research extension of our model consists of analyzing advertising directed
to the customers in an oligopoly setting. In a homogeneous product market, Roy (2000) has
analyzed this issue in a two-stage model where rms rst advertise and then set their prices. In his
model, the advertising technology has the nature of direct-marketing, which diers from ours since
distinct rms are able to target ads to disjunct sets of consumers in his paper; moreover, advertising
has a long run nature and investments in advertising enable rms to strategically segment the
market. However, in a large number of markets advertising has a short run nature instead and
such segmentation cannot arise in equilibrium. We expect the analysis of oligopolistic advertising
with the specication of our paper to lead to very dierent results. First, we believe the conditions
under which customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium to be weaker under oligopoly than
under monopoly. To see this, consider for example a duopoly model of vertical dierentiation a la
Cremer and Thisse (1994). In this model, rms put in the market distinct qualities in an attempt
to reduce price competition. It is easy to see that, for any given pair of qualities, under a customer
directed advertising strategy, low-quality consumers would only be aware of the product oering of
the low-quality rm. This strategic eect weakens competition between the rms and thus increases
the incentives of the high-quality rm to use a targeting advertising strategy. Moreover, this may
have a bearing on quality provision. Thus, if customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium,
the market allocation will probably dier substantially from that under full information, and thus
a welfare analysis is called for to be able to evaluate the social welfare implications of targeting
technologies in oligopoly. This is work that we are pursuing in a separate paper.
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6 Appendix
Name Description Readership Ad price
Medisch Vandaag General 21,240 3,601
Medisch Nieuws General 7,430 2,666
Patient Care General 11,000 2,649
Geneeskundig Adresboek Nederland General 11,024 3,487
Eur. J. of Cardio-Thoracic Surgery Cardiology 1,800 2,929
de Toraxcentre Journal Cardiology 2,500 2,269
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Neurologie Neurology 1,750 2,269
de Neuroloog Neurology 1,000 2,224
NeuroPraxis Neurology 1,875 1,484
Nederlands Tijdschrift v. Mondhygiene Buccal Health 1,850 2,217
Logopedie en Fonietrie Logopedia/Phonetics 4,903 1,840
Tijdschrift voor Verloskundigen Midwifery 2,600 440
Tijdschrift voor Kanker Oncology 3,355 2,085
Medische Oncologie Oncology 1,000 2,518
Acta Neuropsychiatrica Psychiatry 1,370 2,060
de Psychiater Psychiatry 2,250 2,224
Tijdschrift voor Psychiatrie Psychiatry 3,800 1,443
Vademecum Psychiatrie Psychiatry 2,037 3,176
Table A.1: Evidence on Dutch medicine magazines.
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Name Description Readership Ad price
Computer Totaal! General 187,499 11,305
Computer Idee General 156,708 10,030
Computer Thuis en Bedrijf General 84,700 6,480
PC Consument General 51,000 4,600
MacFan Macintosh 21,000 3,600
Atari ST Nieuws Atari 20,000 2,500
PC Gamer Games 40,000 5,700
Games + Games 70,000 2,750
Hoog Speel Games 25,000 4,950
Power Unlimited Games 74,772 10,452
PC Zone Benelux Games 50,000 8,000
Microsoft OÆce Magazine Microsoft 40,000 5,445
WordPerfect Magazine Word Perfect/Corel 25,000 4,300
Windows Magazine Windows 40,000 5,350
Nmagazine Nintendo64console 18,000 4,250
Table A.2: Evidence on Dutch computer magazines.
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